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On the Dependability and Feasibility
of Layperson Ratings of Divergent
Thinking
Richard W. Hass 1*, Marisa Rivera 1 and Paul J. Silvia 2
1College of Humanities and Sciences, Thomas Jefferson University, Philadelphia, PA, United States, 2Department of
Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, United States
A new system for subjective rating of responses to divergent thinking tasks was tested
using raters recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. The rationale for the study was
to determine if such raters could provide reliable (aka generalizable) ratings from the
perspective of generalizability theory. To promote reliability across the Alternative Uses
and Consequence task prompts often used by researchers as measures of Divergent
Thinking, two parallel scales were developed to facilitate feasibility and validity of ratings
performed by laypeople. Generalizability and dependability studies were conducted
separately for two scoring systems: the average-rating system and the snapshot
system. Results showed that it is difficult to achieve adequate reliability using the
snapshot system, while good reliability can be achieved on both task families using
the average-rating system and a specific number of items and raters. Additionally, the
construct validity of the average-rating system is generally good, with less validity for
certain Consequences items. Recommendations for researchers wishing to adopt the
new scales are discussed, along with broader issues of generalizability of subjective
creativity ratings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Creativity is a complex construct, with many different operational definitions (e.g., Plucker et al.,
2004). Though not a perfect proxy for creativity, for over 60 years, divergent thinking tasks have
commonly served as the operational definition of choice for many creativity researchers. This
is becoming increasingly common in the burgeoning neuroscience literature on creativity (e.g.,
Benedek et al., 2014; Madore et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Beaty et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018;
Vartanian et al., 2018). Though some scoring methods are straightfoward (e.g., fluency), there
is considerable disagreement about how to quantify “originality,” “creativity,” or “novelty,” of the
responses themselves. Methods for doing so generally fall into two groups: “objective” methods
that use frequency-based methods and “subjective” methods that rely on groups of raters to make
decisions about different responses. A full discussion of the merits of each method is out of the
scope of the current paper, however, this paper builds on a study by Silvia et al. (2008, Study 1)
that dealt with such details. The interested reader is urged to read that paper in full, along with
several replies (e.g., Kim, 2008; Mumford et al., 2008; Runco, 2008) to gain a fuller perspective on
the issues.
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This paper took aim at constructing a new subjective scoring
system. This new system was developed by considering divergent
thinking tests from the perspective of performance assessment. In
the words of Shavelson et al. (1993), “a performance assessment
[is] a concrete, goal-oriented task ... performed by a [person] on
a particular occasion ... and evaluated by an expert rater who
takes into account the process of accomplishing the task as well
as the final product” (p. 216). What is important about that
definition is that it highlights the importance of considering both
process and product, two of the “several” p’s that are often cited
as different perspectives on assessing creativity (the other two
being person and press). The process by which someone arrives
at a particular divergent thinking response obviously cannot be
totally revealed by only looking at responses, but the scoring
system developed for this study was assembled with the process
in mind. Also, the process by which someone generates a single
divergent thinking response is not the same as the process by
which an artist produces a painting. With regard to the latter, the
term“process” refers to a collection of cognitions and behaviors
that the artist paces through in the course of developing a work.
However, from the perspective of performance assessment, it
should be feasible to design systems for scoring specific tasks in
terms of the goal of the task. That is, if it can be demonstrated that
the current system works for simple tasks like generating uses
for objects, then additional systems can be developed for scoring
more elaborate single-session creations such as collages, solutions
to science and math problems, and even creative writing tasks.
It is important to note that the working definition of
performance assessment above explicitly uses the term expert
raters. However, it is not clear what kind of expertise is needed
to evaluate the creativity of a response to either an Alternative
Uses prompt or a Consequences prompt, or whether training
individuals to rate these responses is even necessary. Indeed,
divergent thinking tests were designed to be used with children
and adults (cf. Wallach and Kogan, 1965; Torrance, 1966), with
no special training. As such, we asked whether reliable ratings
could be obtained from raters without specialized training. This
is both a theoretical and practical concern, as in the former
respect, lay people correspond to the “field” of evaluators in the
Systems Theory of creativity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999). In terms
of the latter, many researchers do not have access to dedicated
research assistants to serve as raters. For the purposes of this
study, adults were recruited from AmazonMechanical Turk, and
given instructions, but no special training, on how to apply the
rating systems. To the extent that their ratings are reliable and
valid, it would mean that with only a small budget, researchers
could obtain reliable ratings for divergent thinking responses
when research assistants or graduate students are not on hand.
To examine the reliability of the new system, and to
consider potential other sources of variation beyond that which
classical test theory (CTT) allows, the current study employed
generalizability theory (Cronbach et al., 1972). As will be
explained generalizability theory (G-theory) is in some sense
a generalization of the methods of CTT such that sources of
measurement error that are confounded in the CTT system
become decoupled in the realm of G-theory (Brennan, 2010).
Somewhat confusingly, reliability of measurements in G-theory
is usually spoken of in terms of dependability, such that a
reliable system ofmeasurement can be depended upon to provide
accurate measures for various purposes. Silvia et al. (2008) used
this system to examine the dependability of raters, and this study
represents an extension of that study to both a new rating system,
and a different population of raters.
1.1. Tailoring Rating Scales to
Task-Specific Performance
It can be argued that on their faces, the Alternative Uses
and Consequences tasks require slightly different approaches
to responding, and thus, might need different criteria for
scoring. Hass (2017a) showed that much of what likely takes
place during generation of Alternative Uses responses is that
the prompt object is used as a cue to the memory system
to search for either known uses or perceptual and semantic
properties of the prompt that would afford some novel use.
However, responding to consequences prompts (e.g., “Imagine
the consequences of people no longer needing to sleep”), likely
requires some form of counterfactual reasoning; the participant
must consider a non-existent state of the world and answer
a series of self-generated “what-if ” questions. The Silvia et al.
(2008) system corresponds with the degree to which participants
can search for semantically remote associations when responding
to Alternative Uses prompts (Hass, 2017b), and scores derived
from those ratings have repeatedly been associated with higher
fluid intelligence abilities (e.g., Nusbaum and Silvia, 2011; Beaty
and Silvia, 2012; Silvia et al., 2013; Kenett et al., 2016) as well as
connectivity with the default mode network of the brain (Beaty
et al., 2015, 2018). However, Consequences prompts have not
featured prominently in cognitive or neuroscience work, which
may be a function of their less than adequate reliability in the
Silvia analysis. Thus, one obvious benefit to deriving a more
dependable system that can be applied to consequences responses
is that it will enable researchers to explore similar effects to those
described above, using the consequences task as a proxy measure
of creative thinking.
As will be described below, the system developed as a part
of the current analysis was designed to provide parallel scales
for Alternative Uses and Consequences responses that differed
with respect to key semantic differentials. Two scales resulted,
each with nearly identical semantic anchors, but with slightly
different criteria on the higher end of the scales that reflect
the differences in what creative thinking entails across the two
tasks. Importantly, the goal was not to obtain a scale that would
quantify the absolute creativity of the response itself, but rather
to quantify the degree to which the response showed evidence of
creative thinking on the part of the person generating it. Taken at
face value, a high score on such a divergent thinking task should
represent the potential to think creatively, and the scale steps
were designed with that notion in mind. The concept is similar
to existing scales of elaboration (Torrance, 1966) that are used to
award points for responses that illustrate more depth of thought.
Table 1 lists the scales as they were given to the raters
(instructions given to raters are described in the Method). It
should be noted that the word creativity does not appear among
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TABLE 1 | Statements that formed the rating scale for alternative uses and
consequences ratings obtained from MTurk workers.
Rating Alternative uses Consequences
1 Very obvious/ordinary use Very obvious consequence
2 Somewhat obvious use Somewhat obvious
consequence
3 Non-obvious use Non-obvious consequence
4 Somewhat imaginative use Somewhat imaginative/detailed
consequence
5 Very imaginative/re-
contextualized use
Very imaginative/detailed
consequence
the descriptors in Table 1. This was purposeful since emerging
research on implicit theories of creativity illustrates that people
often harbor idiosyncratic conceptions of creativity that might
bias their ratings (Hass, 2014; Baas et al., 2015; Hass and Burke,
2016). However, the raters were told that the scales were designed
to measure creativity, and that the responses that were generated
in creative thinking tasks.
The scales were formulated by attempting to distill the
three criteria suggested by Silvia et al. (2008) into one scale.
Obviousness was used instead of commonness for the lower
anchors, as it is the opposite of surprising, a quality of creative
products that some have argued is often missing from existing
scales (Simonton, 2012). A level of shock experienced by the
observer or rater has also been suggested to be essential in
of determining levels of creativity about products or responses
(Bruner, 1962). It is also seen as analogous to commonness as
when evaluating commonness, it is plausible that raters would
evaluate how obvious the response was, that is, they might
evaluate commonness in terms of whether the response might
come to mind easily, or easily be reasoned to apply to the
task. Another reason to avoid commonness is that raters may
be biased by the distribution of responses in the particular
dataset they are viewing. That is, they may deem a response
to be “common” simply because many people thought of it,
not because it represents a relatively uncreative response. For
example, it is quite common for participants to describe uses for
bricks that involve decorating or making art. Clearly those uses
are different than using a brick for building something, and we
felt that obviousness captured the difference.
The top anchor for the Alternative Uses task, was designed to
be applicable to cognitive studies of creative thinking that stress
recombination and re-representation of object properties as key
to the divergent thinking process (e.g., Chrysikou et al., 2016;
Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016). For the Consequences task, the top
anchor was designed to capture imagination and elaboration, the
latter being a scoring system sometimes used for items from the
Torrance Tests (Kim, 2006). As will be described, this divergence
of the two systems was the motivation for defining task family as
a “fixed facet” in the generalizability analysis.
Theoretically, the issues involving inter-scale semantic
differences cannot be addressed via reliability analysis, so we also
conduct a simple construct validity analysis to examine whether
the newly obtained ratings converged with ratings provided by
raters from Silvia’s original study. Among other reasons, we
wouldn’t expect perfect agreement with the Silvia et al. (2008)
ratings because of the slight shift in scale anchors. Although
the scale facets used in the two rating systems are conceptually
similar, the prior scoring yielded only holistic rater estimates
of creativity, so it is difficult to unpack how different raters
weighted or integrated the 3 dimensions of creativity proposed
by Wilson et al. (1953) when giving their ratings (cf. Forthmann
et al., 2016b). However, if the ratings generated using the new
scale correlate at least moderately with the scores derived from
the well-established Silvia system, it would be evidence for
convergent validity between the two systems, and would stand
as preliminary positive evidence for the construct validity of the
new system.
1.1.1. Lay People vs. Trained Raters
Aside from obtaining ratings that might map onto the cognitive
processes involved in generating divergent thinking responses,
the more practical goal of this study was to probe whether
reliable scores could be obtained using raters recruited from
sites such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. Much has been written
about the reliability and validity of subjective creativity rating
systems (e.g., Amabile, 1982, 1983; Kaufman and Baer, 2012).
All of these systems are based on the subjective definition of
creativity given by Amabile (1982) that something is creative
to the extent that people agree that it is (see Amabile, 1982,
p. 1001). Perhaps due to the variety of tasks used by creativity
researchers, some of which require a great degree of skill (e.g.,
drawing), it is reasonable to argue that the judges or raters who
provide subjective assessments of creativity should have some
expertise in the domain (e.g., have studied drawing, know about
art history, etc.). However, there is no special expertise required
for divergent thinking task performance, with the exception of
being adequately literate. In that sense, as long as the raters who
evaluate responses to divergent thinking tasks are familiar with
the task prompts, they ought to be able to provide valid ratings.
Despite the lack of necessity of expertise for rating divergent
thinking responses, many researchers use research assistants
to provide creativity ratings, possibly because such people can
be trained to use the scoring system in a particular way.
For example, some authors pre-categorize responses that seem
alike—equating, say, “doorstop” with “prop a door open”—
reducing the overall number of subsequent ratings. Such a
scheme does require training, and likely some discussion and
revision of such a response reduction due to the blurry
distinctions between category distinctions. The system presented
in this paper does not require this preprocessing step, and the
generalizability analysis will examine whether reliable ratings can
be obtained by leaving similar responses worded as participants
typed or wrote them. To promote this kind of reliability, raters
were explicitly instructed to be consistent in awarding their
ratings to similar responses. They were also told that they may
see many different versions of the same response (they were given
the doorstop example), and that they should try to award similar
ratings to such similar responses.
Finally, there were two reasons to useMTurk workers as raters
rather than research assistants for the current analysis. First, one
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risk of using trained laboratory assistants as raters is that they
may have adopted some implicit bias toward defining creativity as
a part of their work with a particular researcher. As such, though
there ratingsmay be dependable, theymay not be as valid as those
collected by lay people. As a true test of the dependability of this
system, we recruited US citizens from AmazonMechanical Turk,
and gave instructions only on how to apply consistent ratings.
As mentioned earlier, laypeople vary with regard to their implicit
understanding of creativity, so recruiting laypeople for this study
allowed for the rater facet of the G-study to encompass such
a universe of raters. Second, a practical consideration for some
researchers is that research assistants are not always available to
provide ratings. Thus, it would be advantageous to pay MTurk
workers to do the same job.
1.2. A Brief Overview of Generalizability
Theory
Before describing the details of the study, a brief overview of G-
theory is provided here. For more detailed information on theory
and computation the reader is referred to the texts by Brennan
(2001), Cronbach et al. (1972), and Shavelson and Webb (1991).
There are two kinds of analyses that fall under the umbrella of
G-theory. First, a generalizability study (G-study) is performed
in which the error term in CTT is decomposed into various
facets corresponding to sources of variance. In constructing a G-
study, one considers the object of measurement (in this case, a
person), and the universe of admissible observations (UAO) of
performance by this person. The UAO consists of the levels of
the various facets, and in the present case, we considered three
facets: raters (r), task family (t), and items (i). This means we are
interested in the reliability (or in G-theory, dependability) of a
person’s score as raters, task families, and items vary. A researcher
must also decide whether a facet is considered random or fixed,
a decision that affects the scope of the UAO. Random and
fixed facets are similar to random and fixed effects in ANOVA.
For example, following from (Silvia et al., 2008), raters were
considered a random facet in the current study design, meaning
that the raters in this study represent a random sample from
an infinite universe of raters, all of which are interchangeable.
Similarly, the item facet was considered random in the current
design, meaning the particular items (e.g., alternative uses for a
brick) are also considered as a random sample of a potentially
infinite set of prompts for divergent thinking tasks. However,
we treated the task family facet as fixed, meaning that our
analysis cannot be generalized beyond the two types of items
considered: Alternative Uses and Consequences items (tasks).
The motivations for the fixed task family facet were two-fold:
first, the rating scales used in this study were specifically tailored
to these two task families alone. The intent of the study was
to advise users of these two task families on how dependable
scores should be across different numbers of raters and items. The
second motivation was to keep the current design as close to that
used by Silvia et al. (2008), while highlighting a hidden facet in
that design: the item facet.
The second kind of analysis defined by G-theory is a decision
study (D-study). As with G-studies, D-studies follow from
familiar concepts in CTT, mainly the computation of a reliability
coefficient (e.g., coefficient α, Brennan, 2010) . To do so, the
estimates of variance components computed in the G-study
are then used to compute two “reliability-like” coefficients: the
generalizability coefficient,Eρ2, and the dependability coefficient
8. The former can be interpreted similarly to coefficient
α: it is a ratio of “true-score variance” to “relative-error
variance,” essentially “characteriz[ing] error and reliability for
decisions based on comparing examinees”(Brennan, 2010, p.
11). The difference between α reliability and the generalizability
coefficient, is that relative error variance is calculated based
on the partitioned variance components derived from a G-
study. In this way, it provides a more accurate metric for
measurement error, but the scale of the statistic is the same
as α: Eρ2 > 0.80 is considered excellent. The dependability
coefficient is similar, but is composed of the ratio of true-score
variance to “absolute-error variance” and essentially yields a
measure of reliability for “absolute (e.g., pass-fail) decisions about
examinees” (Brennan, 2010, p. 11). As such, the dependability
coefficient is useful for evaluating the “dependability” of any test
that is used in that manner, such as an entrance examination. The
dependability coefficient will always be less than or equal to the
reliability coefficient, due to the differences between relative and
absolute error. However, the dependability coefficient can also
be interpreted on the same scale as α and the generalizability
coefficient (i.e., 8 > 0.80 signifies excellent dependability).
As will be noted, the generalizability coefficient applies to
most psychological studies, as statistical analysis involves only
comparisons of participants. That is, for the current study to
show that the current scales are dependable, it suffices illustrate
the number of raters and items that yield generalizability
coefficients of 0.80 or greater. D-study estimates can be computed
for all kinds of designs. For example, we will calculate the
generalizability and dependability coefficients for research using
3 raters and two items per task family, and also provide
estimates for varying numbers of raters and items. We also
provide instructions on how interested researchers can estimate
generalizability and dependability coefficients for designs of their
choosing.
2. METHOD
2.1. Participants
This study used an existing dataset. A random sample of 80
participants were drawn from among the 227 participants who
comprised the sample for Study 2 by Silvia et al. (2008). These
participants provided responses to two Alternative Uses prompts
(brick and knife) and two Consequences prompts (“humans no
longer need sleep” and “humans are 12 inches tall”). These data
are freely available via Open Science Framework (insert link)
along with the analysis scripts and other data files.
2.2. Current Scoring Systems
2.2.1. Average Creativity
Ratings for each of 2,091 unique responses across the four
prompts were given using the system presented in Table 2.
For each participant, an average rating per rater, per response
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TABLE 2 | Estimated variance components and percent of variance accounted
for from the G-study using MTurk average ratings.
Var source Alternative uses Consequences
Estimate % Estimate %
p 0.167 24.4 0.067 11.0
i 0.069 10.2 0.000 0.00
r 0.181 26.6 0.351 56.9
p× i 0.139 20.4 0.088 14.2
p× r 0.008 1.2 0.015 2.5
r × i 0.021 3.1 0.008 1.2
p× i × r, e 0.096 14.1 0.088 14.2
was first constructed for the purposes of generalizability
analysis. Following that, an average rating for each prompt
was constructed by further averaging the three raters ratings
per response, and then calculating the average rating across
participants Alternative Uses and Consequences responses
separately. Specific instructions provided to the raters are given
below.
2.2.2. Snapshot Scoring
To provide some additional comparison, the snapshot rating
system (Silvia et al., 2009) was also used. The snapshot
system does not involve ratings of each unique response, but
rather requires raters to award a single rating to the set of
responses (Runco and Mraz, 1992; Mouchiroud and Lubart,
2001; Forthmann et al., 2016a,b). As such, this required some
revision of the instructions and dimensions listed in Table 1
described below. For the purposes of generalizability analysis,
there was no need to average scores as each rater assigned
one score to each participant for each prompt. For the validity
analysis, the three rater scores per participant were averaged per
prompt, and those averages were again averaged across the two
prompts within each of the Alternative Uses and Consequences
tasks.
2.2.3. Fluency
Fluency was also tabulated as the number of responses given to
each prompt. For the purposes of validity analysis, an average
fluency score was calculated for each of the Alternative Uses and
Consequences tasks.
2.3. Procedure
2.3.1. Original Divergent Thinking Procedure
Participants recruited by Silvia et al. (2008) were instructed to
“write down all of the original and creative uses for a brick”
and were further prompted to “write down all of the unusual,
creative, and uncommon uses.” Silvia’s participants were asked
to perform this task within the span of 3 min, repeating the same
procedure for the four different scenarios; Alternative uses for a
brick, Alternative uses for a knife, creative consequences for if
people no longer needed sleep, and creative consequences for if
people were 12 inches tall.
2.3.2. Current Rating Procedure
Three raters (all female, M = 47 years old) used the average
rating system to rate the creativity of each and every response
given by all 80 people. They were asked to complete the ratings
over 2 days and were paid $16 each for their work. Raters were
supplied with spreadsheets containing the responses and detailed
instructions on how to use the scale. The instructions explained
that the responses were from participants in a psychology study
about creativity, who were asked to generate responses to specific
prompts. The prompt (e.g., “Alternative uses for a brick”) was
stated as a part of the instructions. They were told that there were
no “correct” answers, and reminded to be consistent in applying
the ratings, specifically, to assign the same or similar ratings for
responses that appeared similar (e.g., “door stop,” “hold a door
open” as uses for a brick). Responses to each task prompt were
separated into different tabs, and each tab was clearly labeled
with the prompt. Participants typed their ratings in the cell next
to each response. They were also asked to comment on the ease
of use of the scale, and all 3 relayed positive comments, with no
rater indicating confusion or lack of ability to rate certain items
consistently.
A second set of three raters (2 females, M = 32.3 years old)
used the snapshot method to rate the set of responses given
by each of the 80 participants to each task. These raters were
also encouraged to complete the ratings over 2 days and paid
$16 for their work. The instructions were identical to the above,
except that these raters were told to provide a rating based on the
creativity of the majority of each participant’s responses. This was
done to discourage a correlation between snapshot scores and
fluency, such that raters were not simply awarding high snapshot
scores to participants who were highly fluent (Forthmann et al.,
2016b). Each participant’s responses were contained in a single
cell in the spreadsheet, with individual responses separated by
commas. Raters indicated the rating in the cell adjacent to the list.
As with the 3 raters that used the average system, the snapshot
raters reported only positive comments about ease of use of the
snapshot scale, with none indicating confusion or lack of ability
to consistently rate participants.
3. RESULTS
All data and analysis scripts are available for download via Open
Science Framework (osf.io/bh35a). Data were pre-processed and
analyzed within the R Statistical Programming Language (R
Core Team, 2016) environment, and using the gtheory (Moore,
2016), psych (Revelle, 2017), and lme4 (Bates et al., 2015)
packages. Graphics were created using the ggplot2 (Wickham,
2009) package.
3.1. Variable Definitions
Since the objects of measurement in this study were persons,
each person in the sample (n = 80) required a single score
from each rater on each item. Four items (two from each family)
were administered to participants: two Alternative Uses tasks
(brick and knife) and two Consequences tasks. For the purposes
of the analyses, the following four scores were calculated for
each person in the study for all four items: (1) “Silvia average
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1343
Hass et al. Generalizability
creativity”: an average score per rater per person per item
(taken from the Silvia et al., 2008, dataset); (2) “MTurk average
creativity”: an average score per person per rater per item using
the new system and the MTurk raters; (3) snapshot creativity: a
single rating per person, per item from a second set of MTurk
raters; and (4) fluency: the number of responses given by each
person to each item.
3.2. Generalizability Study
As previously described, the goal of a G-study to obtain estimates
of the decomposed error term described above (i.e., estimates of
variance attributable to the object of measurement and the facets)
corresponding to a single person, rated by a single rater, on a
single item. These estimates are then used as the basis of the D-
study, in which generalizability and dependability coefficients can
be estimated for designs including varying numbers of raters and
items. For each task family (Alternative Uses and Consequences),
and for each scoring system, we conducted a p × i × r G-study,
which involves estimating 7 variance components: p, i, r, p × i,
p × r, r × i, and the confounding of the residual error with the
three way p× i× r interaction.
3.2.1. MTurk Average Scoring
Table 2 provides the results of the G-study for theMTurk average
scoring procedure. Several notable results emerged. First, about
the same proportion of the variance remains unexplained in
both task families (14.1 and 14.2% for the Alternative Uses
and Consequences families, respectively). Second, there is nearly
twice as much variance attributable to raters on Consequences
items (56.9%) than on Alternative Uses items (26.6%). This
means that there was more agreement among raters for the
average Alternative Uses item than for the average Consequences
item. Additionally, the item facet had appreciable variance for the
Alternative Uses family (10.2%) compared to no item variance
for the Consequences family, meaning that the average amount
of creativity did not vary across Consequences items, but did
so among the Alternative Uses items. However, both families
showed appreciable p× i variance, such that on average, people’s
creative performance was not uniform across items within the
same family. Finally, though rater variance was high for both
items, on average, raters were consistent in applying their ratings
across persons, as in both task families, the proportion of variance
attributable to the p× r interaction was low (1.2% for Alternative
Uses, 2.5% for Consequences).
3.2.2. Snapshot Scoring
Table 3 lists the variance components for the G-study of snapshot
scores with task as a fixed facet. There were both differences and
similarities between these results and those for the average scores.
First, nearly two-thirds of the variability in Alternative uses scores
remained unexplained by the facets, and 75% of the variance
remained unexplained for the Consequences scores. This is an
obvious difference between the two scoring mechanisms, and
suggests that a large proportion of variance is attributable either
to the three way p × i × r interaction, or some unidentified
source of error. Rater variance was relatively large for both
task families here, as it was for the average ratings, though the
TABLE 3 | Estimated variance components and percent of variance accounted
for from the G-Study using snapshot scores.
Alternative uses Consequences
Var source Estimate % Estimate %
p 0.098 6.4 0.100 7.1
i 0.041 2.7 0.016 1.1
r 0.286 18.7 0.161 11.5
p× i 0.000 0 0.034 2.4
p× r 0.104 6.8 0.026 1.9
r × i 0.027 1.8 0.000 0
p× i × r, e 0.971 63.6 1.065 75.9
proportions were lower for the snapshot scores (Table 3) due to
the high proportion of unexplained variance. There was very little
variance left over to be attributed to the other sources and as
with the average scores, the patterns of explained variance were
different across the two task families.
3.3. Dependability Study
To facilitate the use of the current data by other researchers,
we provide some details on calculating the generalizability
coefficient, Eρ2, and the dependability coefficient, 8. The two
coefficients are essentially forms of intraclass correlations, and
vary according to the definitions of error variance. In the next two
sections, we provide generalizabilty and dependability estimates
for the current study design (3 raters and 2 items), but also
present an overview of the formulas that the reader may use—in
consultation with other sources (e.g., Shavelson and Webb, 1991;
Brennan, 2001)—to estimate the two coefficients for a design
of his or her choosing. Following that, we present estimates of
generalizability for a variety of combinations of raters and items.
3.3.1. Generalizability Coefficient and Relative Error
Variance
The formula for the generalizability coefficient is given below:
Eρ2 =
σ 2τ
σ 2τ + σ
2
δ
(1)
In the equation σ 2τ represents universe score variance, which is
set equal to the variance estimate for persons, and essentially
represents true-score variance in CTT. The other term, σ 2δ
represents relative error variance, where relative error is “the
difference between a person’s observed deviation score and his
or her universe deviation score (Brennan, 2000, p. 399).”
The variance in relative errors is estimated using any variance
component that involves an interaction between person and any
random facet. In this study, there are three such terms: the
p × i interaction, the p × r interaction, and the confounded
p × i × r, e residual. Unlike the G-study, these estimates are
intended to represent the mean over the number of items and
raters in a particular study design, and so each term is divided
by the number of different levels of the facet desired for a design.
For example, to estimate the relative error variance in a design
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with 2 items and 3 raters—and thus calculate a generalizability
coefficient for that type of study—the variance attributed to the
p×i component would be divided by ni = 2, the p×r component
would be divided by nr = 3, and the residual would be divided by
the product ni×nr , or 6. Thus, equation for relative error variance
for that design would be:
σ 2δ =
σ 2pi
2
+
σ 2pr
3
+
σ 2pir,e
6
(2)
3.3.2. Dependability Coefficient and Absolute Error
Variance
The dependability coefficient is computed in a similar fashion to
the generalizability coefficient, except that relative error variance
(σ 2δ ) is replaced with an absolute error variance term (σ
2
1). In
Brennan’s (2000) words, “absolute error is the difference between
a person’s observed score and universe score (p. 342).” The
variance of the absolute errors uses all of the estimated variance
components in the G-study except for the universe score variance
[σ 2(p)], and again each variance component is divided by a
number representing the number of conditions in the study for
that facet or interaction. As such, absolute error variance involves
the same terms as relative error, plus terms for the “main effects”
of each facet. Thus, absolute error variance will always be greater
than or equal to relative error variance, and so the dependability
coefficient will always be less than or equal to the generalizability
coefficient. For illustration, absolute error variance for the 2 item,
3 rater design would be:
σ 21 =
σ 2i
2
+
σ 2r
3
+
σ 2pi
2
+
σ 2pr
3
+
σ 2ir
6
+
σ 2pir,e
6
(3)
The dependability coefficient 8 =
σ 2p
σ 2p+σ
2
1
is thus a reliability-
like coefficient which pertains to the reliability of the scores for
“absolute decisions.” An absolute decision might be the decision
to include a person in a special creativity program at school based
on his or her score on this DT measure. Such decisions are not
as common or relevant to psychology researchers, but inclusion
of this coefficient in the analysis is informative. However, both
coefficients are interpretable on the same scale, with 0.80 or better
indicating excellent generalizability or dependability.
3.3.3. D-Study Estimates for the MTurk Average
Ratings
Table 4 provides the estimated variance components along with
the generalizability and dependability coefficients for the current
design (3 raters, 2 items). Note that the estimates of universe-
score variance [σ 2(p)] are identical to those in Table 2, as D-
studies assume that reliability is to be considered for a single
person. The Table lists the various n′s that enter into the formulas
above, and each variance component is equal to the variance
component from Table 2 divided by the corresponding n. As can
be seen, the current design did not reach adequate generalizability
as Eρ2 = 0.65 for the Alternative Uses family, nor for the
Consequences family,Eρ2 = 0.52. The dependability coefficients
are much lower for each family: 8 = 0.47 for Alternative uses
TABLE 4 | D-study estimates using the MTurk average ratings.
Estimate n Alternative uses Consequences
σ2p 1 0.167 0.068
σ2r 3 0.060 0.117
σ2
i
2 0.035 0.000
σ2pr 3 0.003 0.005
σ2
pi
2 0.069 0.044
σ2
ri
6 0.004 0.001
σ2
pri,e 6 0.016 0.015
σ2
δ
0.088 0.064
σ2
1
0.187 0.182
Eρ2 0.65 0.52
8 0.47 0.27
Estimates of variance components, relative error variance (σ 2δ ), absolute error variance
(σ 2∆), generalizability coefficient (Eρ
2 ), and dependability coefficient (Φ) are for the current
design (3 raters, 2 items). Universe-score variance (σ 2τ ) is σ
2
p .
and8 = 0.27 for the Consequences family. These results diverge
with those presented by (Silvia et al., 2008), illustrating the
importance of including the item facet in the study. Specifically,
two items are likely not enough to achieve generalizable or
dependable scores with only 3 raters.
Figures 1, 2 (left side) give more positive results for the
system. Figure 1 is a plot of the generalizability coefficients as
the number of raters range from 1 to 10 (fixing n items at 2)
and Figure 2 is a similar plot, but with number of items ranging
from 1 to 10 (fixing n raters at 3). The horizontal line denotes
.80. Figure 1 (right side) shows that designs with 2 items are not
optimal for any number of raters between 1 and 10. However,
Figure 2 illustrates that with 3 raters, 4 Alternative Uses items
would suffice to achieve sufficient generalizability, while at least 8
Consequences items would be required. This is a positive result
for the current rating system, though at the cost of having to
potentially administer twice asmany Consequences items, should
that be the choice of task family.
Figures 3, 4 (left side) illustrate the dependability coefficient
estimates over the same ranges as Figures 1, 2. Figures 3, 4
illustrates that dependability remains below 0.80 for all designs
and task families. This is not problematic, however, as
dependability is less important for most psychological studies,
which consist of relative statistical comparisons. That is,
generalizability is the more important metric for determining
reliability for use in most experimental and individual differences
research.
3.3.4. Estimates for the Snapshot Scores
Table 5 provides the estimated variance components along with
the generalizability and dependability coefficients for the current
design (3 raters and 2 items) when the snapshot scoring system
was used. As with the average rating system, the estimates are
quite low, and indeed lower than those obtained for the 3 rater,
2 items design with the MTurk average ratings. Figures 1, 2
(right side) consist of plots of generalizability estimates for the
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FIGURE 1 | Plot of changes in the generalizability coefficient (Eρ2) as the number of raters varies from 1 to 10 (n items = 2) for Average Ratings (Left) and Snapshot
Ratings (Right). Horizontal line indicates Eρ2 = 0.80.
FIGURE 2 | Plot of changes in the generalizability coefficient (Eρ2) as the number of items varies from 1 to 10 (n raters = 3) for Average Ratings (Left) and Snapshot
Ratings (Right). Horizontal line indicates Eρ2 = 0.80.
same range of designs described above: fixed items, varying
raters (Figure 1), and fixed raters, varying items (Figure 2). Both
Figures illustrate the superiority of the average rating system
over the snapshot system, and the snapshot system failed to
achieve 0.80 for any of the designs considered here. However,
the reader can freely estimate how many snapshot items or
raters are necessary to achieve adequate reliability. Since the
snapshot system involves arguably less work (reviewing 80
sets of responses vs. nearly 2,000 individual responses) a large
number of raters and items may be feasible and will likely yield
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FIGURE 3 | Plot of changes in the dependability coefficient (8) as the number of raters varies from 1 to 10 (n items = 2) for Average Ratings (Left) and Snapshot
Ratings (Right). Horizontal line indicates 8 = 0.80.
FIGURE 4 | Plot of changes in the dependability coefficient (8) as the number of items varies from 1 to 10 (n raters = 3) for Average Ratings (Left) and Snapshot
Ratings (Right). Horizontal line indicates 8 = 0.80.
adequate generalizability. Figures 3, 4 similarly illustrate that
dependability is quite low for the Snapshot ratings, as it was for
the average ratings. Again, since generalizability is more relevant
to most psychological studies, this is not seen as problematic. It
should be noted, however, that the G-study estimates in Table 3
show that a very large percentage of variance in Snapshot scores
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TABLE 5 | D-study estimates using the snapshot ratings.
Estimate n Alternative uses Consequences
σ2p 1 0.098 0.100
σ2r 3 0.095 0.054
σ2
i
2 0.020 0.008
σ2pr 3 0.035 0.009
σ2
pi
2 0.000 0.017
σ2
ri
6 0.005 0.000
σ2
pri,e 6 0.162 0.117
σ2
δ
0.196 0.203
σ2
1
0.317 0.265
Eρ2 0.33 0.33
8 0.24 0.27
Estimates of variance components, relative error variance (σ 2δ ), absolute error variance
(σ 2∆ ), generalizability coefficient (Eρ
2 ), and dependability coefficient (8) are for the current
design (3 raters, 2 items). Universe-score variance (σ 2τ ) is σ
2
p .
is not accounted for by any of the variance components we
considered (raters and items). So more research is needed to
clarify what other facets may contribute to variability of snapshot
scores.
3.4. Convergent Validity
Despite the potential for the MTurk average rating system to
achieve adequate reliability, the above results do not address
the validity of the ratings. To demonstrate that the current
rating scale (Table 1) actually captures the creativity in people’s
responses, we calculated correlations among all of the scores
currently obtained and the scores culled from the raters used by
Silvia et al. (2008). Table 6 illustrates that the convergent validity
of the new average rating system for alternative uses items with
the Silvia ratings is excellent (r′s > 0.80). Convergent validity
is moderate for the new average ratings on the Consequences
of being 12 inches tall item (r = 0.56), however, the new
and old average sleep ratings diverged considerably (r =–0.10).
This suggests that the sleep item is likely the reason for lower
generalizability of the Consequences items rated with the new
system, as seen in Figures 1, 2.
Convergent validity of the snapshot system with the original
Silvia ratings was moderate, and better for the Alternative Uses
items (r′s > 0.41) than for the Consequences items (r′s >
0.27). The convergence among Consequences items rated with
the two new systems was similar inmagnitude as the convergence
between snapshot ratings and the Silvia ratings, except for
the Consequences of needing sleep item, which again diverged
considerably (r = 0.06). On a positive note, the bottom rows
of Table 6 illustrate the largest fluency-creativity correlation was
only (r = 0.26), exhibited by the snapshot-brick scores. This
illustrates that neither the two new scoring systems—nor the old
rating system—are confounded with fluency scores.
Finally, it should be noted that the intra-task-family
correlations are moderate for the MTurk average scores, and
small to moderate for the snapshot scores. This is also the
case for the original ratings obtained by Silvia et al. (2008).
Inter-task-family correlations were generally small, which also
replicates the data from Silvia et al. (2008). This is a common
occurrence in studies using divergent thinking tasks as proxies
for creativity, and further illustrates the limits of the UAO for
the current G and D studies. This was one of the reasons that
task family was modeled as a fixed facet, as it makes clearer
the fact that Alternative Uses and Consequences items are not
interchangeable with each other across family lines. Rather, it
seems that to a certain extent, the items within each task family
are somewhat interchangeable.
4. DISCUSSION
There were two goals for the current study. First, it was
suggested that more specific criteria be used to allow for more
equitable reliability across the two task types commonly used
by creativity research for assessing idea generation/divergent
thinking. Second, it was hoped that the more specific criteria
would enable the collection of reliable data when using raters
recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system. To a certain
extent, those goals were met, especially when MTurkers rated
each unique response for all items, and then those scores were
averaged per person. However, twice as many raters are necessary
to achieve adequate generalizability when Consequences items
are administered. On the other hand, the Snapshot system may
not yield generalizable or dependable scores even with large
number of raters and items. This was due to a large percentage
of variance potentially linked to facets not modeled in the
current design. So while the Snapshot system may simplify the
rating procedure, the scale currently proposed would be more
accurately applied by having raters rate each unique response to
all items, and then averaging those ratings.
Though the current scales were not designed to perfectly
overlap with other systems and scales, the correlations in Table 6
generally suggest that construct validity is adequate for the
average rating system when applied to Alternative Uses items,
but that there may be less construct validity for the Consequences
rating scale. The latter conclusion is unclear, as the ratings applied
by Silvia et al. (2008) to Consequences tasks were about as reliable
as the current ratings, both of which were less than adequate
(cf. Table 4). Despite that, there seemed to be problems with the
Consequences scale applied to the “...no longer need sleep” item.
Neither the ratings from the average system nor the snapshot
system correlated highly with ratings obtained from the original
Silvia et al. (2008) study. In addition, there was a low correlation
(r = 0.18) between average and snapshot scores obtained
from the MTurkers for the “sleep” item. Thus, researchers are
cautioned that the current rating system used with that item may
not yield either reliable or valid creativity scores.
From the perspective of performance assessment, the results
of this study are positive. The scale developed for current use was
designed to assess creative thinking performance via responses
to two types of divergent thinking items. With the task-family
fixed in the design, we are limited to recommending the scale for
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TABLE 6 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations among fluency, Silvia average scores, MTurk average scores, and snapshot scores.
Variable M SD Intercorrelations (N = 80)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Silvia Brick 1.69 0.30
2. Silvia Knife 1.80 0.32 0.52
3. Silvia 12 Inches 1.41 0.25 0.11 0.14
4. Silvia Sleep 1.53 0.27 0.17 0.24 0.25
5. Average Brick (MTurk) 2.32 0.56 0.80 0.51 0.06 0.06
6. Average Knife (MTurk) 2.72 0.60 0.40 0.82 0.16 0.16 0.50
7. Average 12 Inches
(MTurk)
2.89 0.50 0.25 0.28 0.56 0.32 0.21 0.27
8. Average Sleep
(MTurk)
2.83 0.37 0.20 0.21 0.27 −0.10 0.29 0.27 0.40
9. Snapshot Brick
(MTurk)
2.26 0.70 0.41 0.31 0.17 0.25 0.39 0.19 0.24 0.20
10. Snapshot Knife
(MTurk)
2.59 0.65 0.38 0.57 0.04 0.03 0.40 0.48 0.20 0.33 0.30
11. Snapshot 12 Inches
(MTurk)
2.43 0.80 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.25 0.26 0.48 0.14 0.34 0.16
12. Snapshot
Sleep(MTurk)
2.64 0.60 0.10 0.19 −0.03 0.27 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.18 0.22 0.23
13. Fluency Brick 6.84 2.66 0.12 0.04 −0.07 0.02 0.20 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.13 0.18
14. Fluency Knife 6.36 2.79 0.09 −0.07 −0.10 0.12 0.13 −0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.48
15. Fluency 12 Inches 6.45 2.70 0.00 −0.02 −0.18 −0.10 0.03 −0.03 0.00 0.02 −0.08 0.04 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.46
16. Fluency Sleep 6.49 2.71 −0.09 −0.16 −0.04 −0.22 −0.07 −0.20 −0.02 −0.08 −0.01 0.00 −0.04 0.06 0.22 0.25 0.47
Correlations are Pearson product moment correlations. Fluency scores showed minimal skew. Brick and Knife were the alternative uses items. Twelve inches and sleep were the
consequences items.
use with only Alternative Uses or Consequences items. However,
the convergence of the new ratings with the ratings from Silvia
et al. (2008) was strong, especially for Alternative Uses items,
meaning that this new system captures creativity, and potentially
also captures some aspect of creative thinking performance.
The next step for researchers interested in validating the latter
statement is to use this system as a performance assessment,
potentially testing other psychological hypotheses. Additional
G and D studies are necessary to establish whether or not
this system can be extended to other task families, or indeed
other kinds of creative thinking tasks. However, it should be
noted that dependability was lower, so when using these scales
to form mean comparisons from different groups of people,
a greater number of raters will likely be necessary than when
correlational analyses are used, as in individual differences
research.
4.1. Limitations
Aside from the limits of treating task family as fixed, there are
some theoretical and practical limitations that became obvious
during analysis. First, It should also be noted that elaboration
(detailed responding) was considered as a dimension in the
Consequences task, but was not included as a dimension in
the Alternative Uses task. So in the latter, people likely rated
“doorstop” and “hold a door open” the same, while in the
latter, “no need for beds” and “beginning of an energy crisis”
would be rated differently. We also did not examine the
correlation between the number of words in each response
and creativity, which may be important interpreting ratings
on the Consequences task. Indeed, recent results illustrate
some relation between typing speed and uncommonness of
divergent thinking responses culled from online participants
(Forthmann et al., 2017). However, the purpose of including
detailed/elaborate/imaginative responses on the higher end of
the Consequences scale, is that they might represent several
steps of reasoning, not that they be necessarily long. That is, in
the previous example, “no need for beds” requires one step of
logical reasoning (no sleep → no beds), whereas “beginning of
energy crisis” requires additional steps (no sleep → up late →
darkness → need more light → burn more energy). Further
research is necessary to verify that such reasoning is common
in Consequences tasks, and may necessitate the revision of the
current scale for rating Consequences responses.
Finally, this set of responses was not very large, nor were the
number of tasks numerous to potentially fatigue raters. Each
rater was able to return his or her ratings within 2 days of
receiving the response lists, and no complaints were made via the
free response questions raters completed upon submitting their
work. However, researchers should be advised that MTurkers
are very task-oriented, and need specific instructions on how
to perform their tasks, and how to allot their time. That is, it
would be advisable to consider whether or not raters should be
asked to assess all responses, or whether subsets of raters can be
assigned specific subsets of responses. This changes the design
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of our G-study, but such a procedure is easily accommodated
within G-theory, though another analysis would be necessary.
Similarly, the current set of responses was already “cleaned”
of inappropriate or non-sensical responses, and it would be
advisable for others to do the same before obtaining ratings, as
it is possible that raters would be less reliable when rating such
responses.
5. CONCLUSION
The goal of this analysis was to assess whether or not laypeople,
recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk, could provide reliable
and valid ratings for divergent thinking responses from the two
task families considered. Indeed, we found that using the newly
constructed scale reported herein, MTurkers provided reliable
and valid ratings, but only when each response in the entire set
was rated individually. In addition, the scale was more reliable
when used for Alternative Uses items than for Consequences
items, and with 3 raters, a study would likely need double the
amount of Consequences items to achieve the same level of
reliability as a study with only Alternative Uses items. Thus,
as a general recommendation, researchers adopting these scales
should pay special attention to the choice of items and the
choice of raters. For economical designs, 3 raters are generally
advisable for Alternative Uses items, and at least 4 items should
be used. For studies using Consequences items, researchers can
choose between a large number of items and a moderate number
of raters, or a moderate number of items and a large number
of raters. In either case, the current study provides researchers
who lack research assistants with a new method for obtaining
creativity ratings for two types of divergent thinking tasks. It is
hoped that other researchers adopt and refine these scales, and
generate additional scales for more standardization of creativity
rating systems across studies.
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